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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the manipulation of the memory of the Hamburg Massacre
of 1876. During the massacre, one white Carolinian and six black Carolinians were
killed. Forty years later, in 1916, a monument was erected in North Augusta, South
Carolina to honor and remember Mckie Meriwether, who was described as the only
person killed during the massacre. The monument does not mention the true horrific
history of the white terrorism against black Carolinians. After white Carolinians
reclaimed power in the state, they were able to alter the memory of the Hamburg
Massacre from a horrific to heroic event.
By utilizing newspapers from the era, this thesis examines how the memory was
manipulated starting from immediate reactions to the massacre in 1876 to the creation of
the monument in 1916. The memory was changed through the political rise of the white
Carolinians involved, most significantly Matthew Butler and Ben Tillman. Once white
Carolinians had control over state politics, they were able to use their influence to
overshadow the real horrors of the massacre. The same type of manipulation took place
throughout the South and continues to impact southern history and identity.
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INTRODUCTION
MEMORY IN THE SOUTH
For almost a century, the McKie Meriwether monument in North Augusta, SC
served as the only reminder of the Hamburg massacre. It still stands today in J. C.
Calhoun Park, but now represents the manipulation of southern memory by white
Carolinians. According to the inscriptions on the monument, it honors the only resident
who was killed during the Hamburg controversy. And it argues that Meriwether was a
hero of his time whose memory deserved commemoration for future generations. Like
most histories in the South, there was another side to the story besides the one described
on the monument. Meriwether was the only white man killed at Hamburg on July 8,
1876. Six black men were also killed: James Cook, Moses Parks, Allan Attaway, David
Rivers, Hampton Stephens, and Albert Myniart. These black men were murdered for the
political gain of whites, four of them publicly executed, and the memory of Hamburg was
deliberately overshadowed and silenced as a substantive part of the commemoration of
Meriwether.
In 2011, a plaque that describes the fuller history of Hamburg was dedicated. It
was at first displayed at First Providence and Second Providence Baptist churches in
North Augusta. The initial plans were to place the plaque on the Fifth Street Bridge in
North Augusta, but the Heritage Council of North Augusta, the non-profit organization
which sponsored the creation of the plaque, feared it would be vandalized. Instead it was
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placed near another historic marker by the historic Carrsville Community.1 Yet today the
issues of South Carolina history are still controversial. As historians (and Carolinians)
begin to reassess their understanding of southern history, it is important to note that a
great deal of Carolina history was altered to honor white Carolinians and silence the
history of black Carolinians. At Hamburg, for instance, memory was changed by white
Carolinians through political elections and the promotion of public figures who had roles
in the event. After the massacre, the white Carolinians used Hamburg as a tool to help
reclaim dominance over politics and society. The white men who participated in
Hamburg used their participation as a platform to boast of. Not in spite of the white
Carolinians’ participation in the murder of six black men, but because of it, they won
election to political offices. Once they were in power, the whitewashed stories of
Hamburg were perceived as factual, and blacks had no power to question or argue the
white claims. The creation of the Meriwether monument marks the attempt to create a
permanent historical acceptance of the white Carolinian memory of Hamburg.
The event at Hamburg was one of the planned attacks used by white Carolinians
to regain political power. On July 4th 1876 the city of Hamburg celebrated Independence
Day with a parade. After the war, blacks used these national holidays to celebrate their
freedom.2 The black militia, led by Doc Adams, was marching in the street for the
parade when Thomas Butler and Henry Getzen, two white farmers from Edgefield, South
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Carolina, tried to ride their buggies through the ranks. The militia refused to break ranks
and move out of the way. The white men argued with the militia and forced their way
through the street. The white men could have taken a different route through the city or
gone around the militia, but these men were looking for a reason to start trouble. Later
Butler and Getzen went to the black town justice, Prince Rivers, to press charges against
Adams for blocking the street. Butler and Getzen were supported by their attorney,
Matthew C. Butler. Adams countersued the whites with interfering with the militia drill.
The trial was set for July 8, 1876.
On July 8th, several hundred rifle club members came into Hamburg in support of
Butler and Getzen. White southern men created rifle clubs as a way to gather together
and own weapons since they refused to participate in the local militias because of the
black members. The trial itself was postponed which Rivers and Matthew Butler
negotiated with one another. Matthew Butler requested that the black militia turn over
their guns to him, but Adams refused. Rivers tried to keep the situation under control by
working with both groups, but the white men were clearly looking for the opportunity to
cause violence. The militia refused to turn over their arms, and instead stationed
themselves inside a warehouse. The whites followed and positioned themselves as an
army ready for battle. They even brought a cannon with them. Soon shots were fired and
one white man, McKie Meriwether, was killed. Two black men, Jim Cook and Moses
Parks, were killed while trying to escape the warehouse. The white men captured many
of the militia and held the men as captives. Five blacks, Allan Attaway, David Phillips,
Pompey Curry, Albert Myniart, and Hampton Stephens, were called out from the group
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to be killed. All of them were executed in cold blood except Pompey Curry, who
managed to escape and hide from the whites.
The terror of Hamburg helped result in the overthrow of Reconstruction when
Wade Hampton was elected governor three months later. None of the white men at
Hamburg were convicted for the murder of innocent blacks; instead these men became
prominent leaders in South Carolina. In 1916, a monument was created in North
Augusta, S.C. to honor Meriwether’s death during the massacre, which whites referred to
as a riot. The creation of this monument is the focus of this thesis. Through the rise of
political leaders, especially Ben Tillman, the memory of the Hamburg Massacre was
altered in order to uplift white southerners.
In recent years the study of memory and history has been a topic of debate,
especially in the South because of the division between history and white-manipulated
history. The division creates two separate histories of the South, one told from the black
southern perspective and the other told from the white southern perspective. Modern
historians acknowledge this problem, as James C. Cobb argues. “Nowhere is this division
more obvious than in the never-ending conflicts over the Confederate flag, Confederate
monuments, and other symbolic reminders of slavery and segregation,” he writes.3 The
separation hastened by misrepresentation includes the symbols of Reconstruction. While
Reconstruction is often overshadowed by the white memory of the Civil War, how
Southerners remembered Reconstruction changed how the South evolved.
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Southern history is currently undergoing a revolution that questions the way it is
represented in society. Various historians and public history professionals argue that the
kind of Southern history represented in books, schools, monuments, buildings, and road
names does not properly represent the region’s fullest history. Many of these scholars
and activists want to change the representations, especially in public spaces, to more
accurately depict Southern history. For instance, on the campus of Clemson University,
students, staff, and faculty are currently debating the memory of Ben Tillman, a prolynching racist leader of South Carolina, who also participated in the massacre at
Hamburg. The most iconic building on Clemson’s campus is named after Tillman, who
had a founding role in the creation of the university. The building, which was originally
named Old Main, was changed to Tillman Hall in 1946—just at the beginning of the era
which C. Vann Woodward has called the “Second Reconstruction.” While some
students, faculty, and alumni support keeping Tillman’s name on the building, since he
was involved in the creation of Clemson, others want it removed because of his lasting
and infamous legacy with race. Controversies like these show no signs of abating. But
even talking about it is breaking a silence long meant, deliberately, to empower white
memory by erasing or enshrouding black memory. This is an especially important
dynamic in South Carolina, where African-American history has been and continues to
be vital in understanding the state. For most of the state’s history, in fact, most
Carolinians have been black. In order to better understand South Carolina history,
Carolinians should acknowledge the evolution of their history to better recognize a
discriminatory landscape.

5

Christopher A. Cooper and H. Gibbs Knotts argue that three different memory
movements are occurring in the contemporary South: de-Confederation, reConfederation, and African-Americanization. The de-Confederation of the South
involves an effort to remove the symbols of the Confederacy and the replacing of
Confederate names on buildings, roads, and highways. The removal of the Confederate
flag is probably the best-known example of how southerners want to step away from their
connections with Confederate history. For Southerners demanding de-Confederation, the
Confederacy does not represent Southern identity, but instead symbolizes white
supremacy and pro-slavery ideas. De-Confederation allows for AfricanAmericanization, which supports a black identity within Southern history and focuses on
elevating black memory. African Americanization not only wants to rid the Southern
landscape of Confederate symbols, but wants to rename buildings, roads, and highways
from a perspective based in black history. The opposite approach is taken by Southerners
involved in re-Confederation, a movement which consists of southerners who want to
continue to honor Confederates as heroes of the South.4
The existence of these three movements suggests an ongoing struggle as black
and white southerners confront their shared past. The difficulty of the struggle is evident
in the evolution and transformation of the memory of Hamburg. The white Carolinians
involved at Hamburg did not want to be remembered as violent racists; instead they
wanted their lasting legacy to be heroic. And for a long time their desires prevailed. As
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stories of heroic white Southerners such as those engaged at Hamburg were passed down
over time, new generations of white southerners sought to honor their ancestors.
Through this kind of fileopiety, white Southerners were always remembered as heroes,
even as the fileopiestic element encrusted the memory in deeper and deeper layers of
tradition. But black Southerners were either not talked about or biasedly represented.
Such a divide in Southern memory creates a racially divided history rather than a shared
past. Unless Southerners can come to turns with both sides of history there will always be
conflict not just over events such as Hamburg—but over who, and what, is a Southerner.
Those questions are important, too, in public history. As views broaden, the
public is urging public historians to interpret and integrate both the white and black
versions of history at museums and historical sites. A couple of examples offer
illustrations. At Clemson University, in South Carolina, new movement known as See the
Stripes is focused on educating students, faculty, and alumni on the University’s troubled
racial past. Most of the public attention has been focused on the movement’s attempt to
rename Tillman Hall, an example certainly of de-Confederation and possibly of African
Americanization. A less well-known but equally important focus of the movement’s
demands involves the history taught to guests at Fort Hill. Fort Hill was the home of John
C. Calhoun and later Thomas Green Clemson, founder of Clemson College, but it was
fundamentally a plantation big house: the University is built on a former plantation,
which most students do not realize before coming to the University.
Nor are they really taught. Fort Hill is known for its variety of antiques and
original artwork and its focus on Calhoun as a political leader; it does little to expound on
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the existence of slavery on the plantation. The tour guide and manual provide details on
the lives of the Calhoun and Clemson family, and even describe each piece of furniture in
the house. Very little however is said about enslaved people. The only information
included is on a couple house slaves, though hundreds of enslaved worked on the
plantation. As Orville Vernon Burton argues, “when slavery is left out, the history is
distorted; and when history is distorted, people feel justified in harboring anger,
bitterness, and resentment.”5
The same feelings accompany public monuments. Monuments serve as a
permanent reminder of the past. In the South, however, almost every monument in a
public space represents only white history, with most of these honoring Confederate
soldiers. As with issues over race in historical houses such as Fort Hill and at historical
sites generally, monuments should be re-evaluated in light of both black and white
history. In 2000 a controversy occurred in Caroline County, Virginia over the
memorialization of a slave, Gabriel. Supporters of a more inclusive Southern history
wanted to create a monument in honor of a failed slave revolt of 1800. The group wanted
to honor and remember those slaves who were killed because of their rebellion, but also
the rebellion’s leader, Gabriel. The county board rejected the creation of the monument
because it did not want a monument that “glorified violence and inflamed racial
tensions.”6 It is ironic that Southern towns and cities are filled with memorials of the
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Confederacy, which was founded in violence to protect a system of slavery based in
violence, but reject memorials to honor slaves who suffered under the restraints of a
violent system. “Until we accept Gabriel,” Cleo Coleman, an advocate for the
monument, argues, “we accept the myth that slaves were content with their condition, had
no interest in freedom, and were not entitled to it.”7
Many southern blacks criticize the misrepresentation of history supported by
monuments around the South. “For many black southerners,” Cobb argues, “the
widespread assault on Confederate icons and symbols went hand in hand with the
creation, preservation, or renovation of a new set of icons and monuments memorializing
the crusade to free the South from the racial system constructed on the ruins of
Confederate legacy.”8 With all the controversies that are occurring throughout the South,
and especially in South Carolina, attention needs to be brought to the Meriwether
monument that still stands in North Augusta. Raised as a legacy to the heroism of white
Carolinians, it is hard to see the monument today as much more than a monument to the
terrorism inflicted on blacks Carolinians. A full history, though, is not so much a victims’
history as it is a shared history of Southerners. “The black southerner and the white
southerner are locked to the land and to the history,” as Maya Angelou claims, “a painful
history of guilt and cruelty and ignorance. It clings to us like the moss on the trees.”9
Brundage puts it another way. “To understand fully the significance of these
controversies,” he argues, “we should pay attention to the history that southerners have
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valued, the elements of their past they have chosen to remember and forget, the ways that
they have disseminated their past, and the uses to which their memories have been put.”10
The manipulation of the memory of Reconstruction was supported by
contemporaries, but it was legitimated as history by the earliest of professional scholars at
the turn of the twentieth century. William A. Dunning, a professor at Columbia
University, pioneered the professional study of Reconstruction. Under his influence, the
Dunning school of scholars argued that Reconstruction was a tragic, failed period of
American civilization because the South was overrun by carpetbaggers and freedmen
who corrupted its institutions. White southerners were the victims in this history. An
example of it is historian Henry T. Thompson’s Ousting the Carpetbagger from South
Carolina, which appeared in 1926. Not only did the book glorify white Carolinian
history; Thompson actually dedicated it to the Red Shirts of 1876. Thompson described
South Carolina after the war as a land of destruction and devastation. Towns and farms
and even cities had been burnt to the ground; its (white) people were sufferers. He
blamed the radical Republicans and freedman for misrule and corruption, and for all the
other dislocations facing white Carolinians during Reconstruction. He even attempted to
manipulate the memory of national leaders such as Abraham Lincoln, who might
otherwise be remembered for Union victory and emancipation but who, in Thompson’s
telling, was no different than Andrew Johnson—a hero of sorts to the unreconstructed.
Lincoln and Johnson would not have allowed newly freed blacks to gain political power,
Thompson wrote: “Thus it will be seen that neither Lincoln nor Johnson regarded as
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necessary to Reconstruction the giving of universal suffrage to the recently freed negro . .
. In fact, both publicly declared they did not favor doing so.”11
Thompson argued that white Carolinians had few options to protect themselves
against violence committed by Carolina blacks, and for the intimidation and violence
supposedly used by Republicans to steal elections. White Carolinians created the Ku
Klux Klan in self-defense and in civil defense—the protection of democracy. Any
violence that occurred thereafter was because white Carolinians were defending
themselves and heroically defending civic virtue. “During all the years of
Reconstruction.” Thompson wrote, “and particularly in the sections of the State where
they were in a great majority, the negroes, under the guidance of their designing leaders,
had practiced the most brutal forms of intimidation and had perpetrated all kinds of
frauds at the ballot box.”12 The savior of Reconstruction was Wade Hampton.
Thompson claims that the “ousting” was redemptive: under Hampton, not only was civic
virtue and white democracy restored, but so was peace and good order. These twin
victories were staples of the white triumphal view as first cast in professional history by
Dunning scholars. It nevertheless was a biased view of history that altered the way the
South, and the nation, viewed Reconstruction.
Just as historians supported and documented the white version of history in their
books, white women in the South uplifted white Southerners as heroes. Women’s groups
such as the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) or the Ladies Memorial
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Association (LMA) existed across the region; their activities stressed the heroism and
valor of white men despite the devastation of Confederate defeat. “The UDC
accomplished in peacetime what their Confederate forebears had failed to achieve during
war,” Karen Cox argues. “The Daughters did so by memorializing dead Confederate
soldiers and the society that they had fought to preserve.”13 In fact, where white men in
the South often had to toe a fine line, for fear of inviting retaliation or increased Federal
vigilance, women were able to preserve heroic ideals of the South after the war because
the North did not view them as a political threat. The North did not recognize the type of
permanent influence these women’s ideas would have on the memory of the South. But
in fact, in sustaining a heroic memory, they helped make essential the heroic ideal that
underlay the violence of Reconstruction and ultimately the manipulation of its narrative.14
Brundage argues that women’s control of public memory was a feature unique to
the South. In England, Germany and France, governments controlled public space and
therefore the shape of public memory. These governments made sure that the public
memory honored the aristocratic families. But because state and local governments did
not step in to help control the memory of the South, women were able to fill a vacuum.
“Throughout the nineteenth century state governments abjured responsibility over
historical memory because it fell within that area of the public realm,” as Brundage
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argues, “where their authority ended and the traditional authority of home and church
began.”15
The most influential method by which women shaped southern memory was in
the creation and raising of monuments. LMA organizations established many
monuments in cemeteries, but the UDC placed monuments in towns and cities across the
South. Monuments served as a “daily reminder” of the past. Even those who could not
read were influenced by the visual presence of the monuments.16 “The stone soldiers
who stand sentinel in southern towns pay homage to white heroes who were revered as
both loyal southerners and American patriots, for their defense of states’ rights.” Cox
argues.” Significantly, southern blacks, who had no stake in celebrating the Confederacy,
had to share a culture landscape that did.”17
Blacks, however, were not silent. They attempted to preserve and promote their
memory, but instead of creating monuments they organized and participated in
celebratory events. Kathleen Clark argues that in order to fully understand the
manipulation of Southern memory, one must recognize the different white and black
memorial movements during Reconstruction and the different forms they took.18 Blacks
honored days that represented freedom, such as the Fourth of July and Emancipation
Day. Typically, though, and especially after Reconstruction, these were celebrated in
spaces set apart, such as black churches. Public space could be denied to them either by
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the intimidation of the landscape itself, or by the outright refusal of whites to allow
blacks any type of celebration or remembrance in spaces they controlled. White
southerners used threats and violence to cease all types of black advancements and
celebrations. It was during one of these celebrations on July 4, 1876, on the public street
in Hamburg, that led to the murder of the six black men in the town several days later.
As was deliberately intended, black memorialization was, and still is, often “forgotten”
because they did not leave a physical imprint on the South like white southerners.
The Lost Cause was the main device used by white southerners to alter the
memory of three periods in Southern history that became one within the mythology: the
antebellum South, the Confederate experience during the Civil War, and Reconstruction.
Historians have defined the Lost Cause in a variety of ways, but each definition stresses
its idealization of the white South. And no matter their emphases, all would agree with
Karen Cox’s central contention that the Lost Cause was “an idealized portrait of the
antebellum South, one that romanticized white paternalism and African American slavery
and glorified the valor of Confederate soldiers.”19
The Lost Cause myths created a racialized Southern history even as it made white
society organic, without social division. All white men were courageous and supported
the Confederacy, all Southern belles were proper, and all slaves were faithful. These
mythologized types became embedded in popular culture—another form of public
space—in famous movies such as Birth of a Nation. “In this way, the plantation legend,
taken over by the emerging culture industry, ceased to be exclusively a myth of the
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South,” Wolfgang Shivelbusch claims. “Instead, it became a part of the escapist dream
factory that would ultimately appropriate all periods of human history and that would
later be known as Hollywood.”20 For southerners the best vindication after the war was
the national acceptance of the Lost Cause. Novels about the South became very popular
in the North since they described a type of mythical land that public audiences enjoyed
reading about. However, even though these stories were not true, they evolved into the
widely accepted history of the South, in part because they also complemented the
histories of the Dunning school. The harsh reality that blacks experienced in these periods
were either not included or, more often, the stereotypes simply imposed on them
More importantly, the Lost Cause was a form of power. White southerners used
the ideas of the Lost Cause to justify white supremacy. The defense of antebellum
slavery, for example, was used to justify segregation and impose stability and “order.”
White southerners argued that blacks were dependent on the restraints of slavery and that
they would need restraints to function outside of slavery. Janney claims, “By imaging the
interracial place of the ‘Old South’ and the ‘blackness of Reconstruction,’ Southern
whites rewrote their history to make their white supremacist laws seem not only natural,
but necessary.”21 By changing the history of the race relations in the antebellum South,
southerners disenfranchised the future for blacks.
Historians tend to focus on the impact of the Lost Case on the memory of the
Civil War, but it is important to emphasize its influence on the memory of
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Reconstruction. During Reconstruction, Lost Cause ideas were used to justify the violent
actions of white Southerners. In the Lost Cause version of Hamburg, for example, white
Carolinians claimed they were innocent victims of the black militia’s harassment. The
Meriwether monument represents a permanent memory of this, a preeminent Lost Cause
version of history. And as David Blight shows, the Lost Cause was also used as the
vehicle by which the white Americans, North and South, reconciled themselves in the
thirty years following the war. Both sides agreed that the common valor of both, and not
issues of race or slavery or emancipation, were the war’s worthiest legacies. In that way
the Lost Cause prevented the nation from fully understanding the problems blacks faced
in the South. It has and in some ways continues to obscure the nation’s view of AfricanAmerican history/ The South, in particular, has still not fully confronted the issues
involved in how to remember blacks in its history. For Southerners to move past the
problems of race, David Goldfield argues that whites and blacks need to create a common
memory, and in order to create this memory, whites and blacks must accept each other’s
past. “What is needed is not so much a merger of Robert E. Lee and Martin Luther King
Jr.,” Goldfield writes, “as a better understanding of both, an appreciation that one can
accept the past without distorting it or denigrating others.”22
During the 1960s historians began to question the meaning of the white
monuments in modern society. This might be considered the beginning of deConfederation. This new research created a backlash that consisted of white Southerners
refusing to let go of Lost Cause memory. These Southerners pushed for more
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memorialization of the Civil War, especially since the 1960s was also the centennial
period of commemoration. The contest, in some ways, is ongoing. The backlash
continues to be evident in modern examples of re-Confederation; de-Confederation is
most evident in the resistance to it, but especially in black-led movements that push for
the inclusion and the memory of black history. Perhaps the best-known example is in
Richmond, Virginia, the capital of the Confederacy, with the creation of the Arthur Ashe
Memorial on Monument Avenue. The monument honored a black tennis player on what
had been a boulevard dedicated to the heroic marble memorials to Southern white valor:
Robert E. Lee, J.E.B Stuart, Stonewall Jackson, and Jefferson Davis. More recently,
though only in response to a violent racial tragedy with echoes of Hamburg, the state of
South Carolina has taken down the Confederate flag that had flown on the State House
grounds for more than 60 years. As de-Confederation and perhaps AfricanAmericanization continues, more monuments like Ashe’s might be created, and older
monuments to white supremacy might be reinterpreted. As Cynthia Mills argues, “With
preservation has come the opportunity to reinterpret the monuments and make decisions
about how they can continue to function.”23
In order for the South to overcome the racialized versions of memory,
Southerners have to confront and accept the past, both black and white. As South
Carolina in particular deals with current racial tensions as well as its separate pasts,
Carolinians should educate themselves on how the memory of the past was often altered.
Memory, as Charles Reagan Wilson argues, “brings attention to the issues of social

23

Mills and Simpson, Monuments to The Lost Cause, xxv.

17

identity, cultural legitimacy, power and political norms.”24 As the issues of southern past
still haunt southerners today, it is important for southerners to accept the past, understand
it, and learn from it. “Part of the tangled knot of race is the way the country remembers
Reconstruction,” Burton argues, “which is probably more important to public memory
than memory of the war itself.”25
The following two chapters analyze the white manipulation of the memory of the
Hamburg massacre. The first chapter follows the immediate reaction of the event in 1876
to the political rise of Benjamin Tillman due to his outspoken support of his participation
of the murders. The chapter uses newspaper accounts from around the nation to describe
the different perspectives of how the story was told in the South compared to the North.
The nation initially condemned the white Carolinians actions, yet other regions which did
not support the national government’s involvement in the safety of the black Carolinians.
Without the support of the national government the white Carolinians were not charged
for terrorism; instead several of the men involved used Hamburg as a political platform.
The two most influential leaders involved at Hamburg who were elected were Matthew
C. Butler and Ben Tillman. Both men boasted of their actions at Hamburg which helped
them gain support in subsequent elections. The chapter examines how white Carolinians
used their political power to alter southern memory.
The second chapter analyzes the creation of the McKie Meriwether monument.
Similar to the first chapter, it relies on newspapers to examine how white Carolinians
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supported their version of history. By the 1900s southerners viewed the Hamburg event
as a heroic moment. Tillman’s national race talks served as an initial proposal for a
monument dedicated to the heroes of Reconstruction. Throughout his speeches he
praised and justified the actions of white Carolinians, especially the Hamburg event. J. P.
DeLaughter suggested for the creation of the monument in 1912. After support from the
state, the monument was erected in 1916 as a reminder to all southerners of the sacrifices
made by white Carolinians during Reconstruction. However, the monument purposely
leaves out the true story of the Hamburg event.
White Southerners changed the history of this period to uphold white supremacy.
The Meriwether monument exemplifies the manipulation. By 1916, Hamburg was an
event white Southerners honored and commemorated. As Cynthia Mills argues, however,
“the meaning of public sculpture is not fixed but changes as audiences’ experience and
beliefs grow increasingly distant from original understandings.”26 The memory of
Hamburg should not be forgotten, but its meaning need not be fixed. The Meriwether
monument should represent the violence that blacks faced during Reconstruction, and it
should become a tool to help Southerners end the struggle over race and memory.
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CHAPTER ONE
FROM HORRIFYING TO HEROIC
White Carolinians manipulated the memory of the Hamburg massacre in order to
support the reestablishment of white Democratic control within South Carolina. The
event was a national headline and areas outside the South were shocked by the blatant
racial violence. White Carolinians however refused to let the nation criticize their
behavior, so they created justifications for their actions. Through these justifications
white Carolinians placed the blame of the violence on the black militia. Several of the
white men argued that the black militia taunted them and initiated the conflict, which led
to the murder of six black men and one white. Newspapers throughout the South tended
overwhelmingly to support the white Carolinian view by only publishing the white
memory of the event. These newspaper reports provide a clear picture of how white
Carolinians manipulated the memory of Hamburg to belittle black men and uplift whites
as heroes.
Immediately after the massacre, black Carolinians sought help from the United
States government for protection, but the government refused to send federal troops to
South Carolina because it did not view the massacre as a national issue. Black
Carolinians understood that the violence represented more than just racial hatred: it was
political violence. The type of violence separated the massacre from other forms of
violence around the nation. Their violence was a form of terrorism. White Carolinians
used it in order to regain political power within the state.
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As southern whites reclaimed power, South Carolina blacks lost control over the
advancements made during Reconstruction. White southerners used the power they
acquired to change public memory. The white Carolinian memory became more
dominant as the white men involved at Hamburg were elected to public office. Just a few
years after the massacre, white politicians of South Carolina boasted over their
involvement. It became a political platform used by leaders such as Matthew Butler and
Ben Tillman. As Fitzhugh Brundage argues, the ones who controlled the memory
controlled the public space, and vice versa. Once white southerners had control of South
Carolina they were able to alter the memory of the massacre, and impose it not just in
history books, but on the landscape.27 As Stephen Budiasnky suggests, “The way it made
a victim of the bully and a bully of the victim, turned the very act of Southern white
violence into wounded Southern innocence, turned the very blood of their African
American victims into an affront against Southern white decency.”28 The memory of
Hamburg evolved as white Carolinians became increasingly dominant in politics.
Ultimately the massacre became a heroic moment for white southerners even as white
memory created a false history of blacks which blamed them for the violence.
Many terms were used to describe the event at Hamburg such as the “Hamburg
matter,” “Hamburg business,” “Hamburg slaughter,” and “Hamburg affair,” but none of
these had a lasting impact. Two very different terms ultimately did, and they
encapsulated the struggle for memory. Both were political, because each term created a
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contrasting story. Massacre was the term of choice for blacks and northern Republicans.
Massacre suggested the sheer violence of Hamburg. Massacre has also become the
preferred description for modern historians, for, as Budiansky recently argues, Hamburg
was a form of terrorism. White Carolinians came to Hamburg with the purpose of
murdering blacks for political gain.
Massacre was frequently used immediately after the event, but as white
southerners began to manipulate memory, it was used less. By 1900 riot became the
lasting white definition. White Carolinians used riot in order to justify their violence.
The white men involved at Hamburg defended their actions and claimed it was a mere
political disturbance, a donnybrook of sorts, because riots were often associated with
disorderly political events, such as the Great Railroad Strike of 1877. During the strike,
railroad workers fought back against militia who tried to reopen railroad services.
Similarly, white Carolinians defended their actions by claiming Hamburg too was a
political disturbance. It was not a question of moral culpability but rather a question of
political interest and the ability to defend and oppose it. Because reclaiming political
sovereignty for white men was a heroic endeavor and because they could associate
Northerners and blacks with disorder, the white men who used the term riot uplifted their
roles as heroes, restorers of peace and order, and not murderers.
Immediately after Hamburg, most national newspapers, including the New York
Times, called the event a massacre. Many Northerners were shocked by the racial
violence that still existed within the South. The term massacre insinuates that the
perpetrators were uncivilized, which was ironic since blacks were often viewed as
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uncivilized. This was sometimes evident in international coverage. “But the whites of
South Carolina are men of our own race and religion, inheriting English laws, and
belonging to a nation which, in the main, is as full of respect for life as any community in
the world,” A London newspaper claimed, “Yet unless they have been grossly maligned,
they have done a deed as detestable in its atrocity as many of the murders committed by
the half-savage Turkish cital.”29
Still, for most people who used the term, the stakes were political. Moral outrage
could not conceal the deeply political purpose of using it in order to keep Southern
Democrats from reestablishing power. No better example of this exists than Governor
Daniel Chamberlain’s letter to President Ulysses S. Grant. Chamberlain argued, “The
recent massacre at Hamburg, in this State, is a matter so closely connected with the
public peace of this State that I desire to call your attention to it for the purpose of laying
before you my views of its effect, and the measures which it may become necessary to
adopt to prevent the recurrence of similar events.”30 For Chamberlain, Hamburg was not
just a local problem. It threatened to imperil society as a whole.
Black Southerners promoted the term massacre to expose the racial violence of
the South. After a meeting in Charleston in July 1876, a group of blacks sought
vindication for the murder of the six men at Hamburg. They argued that “the massacre of
colored citizens at Hamburg, S. C., is unworthy of any civilized community, and deserves
the censure and condemnation of the civilized world.”31 While South Carolina blacks
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also emphasized the racial element of the violence, they argued that the violence was a
national issue because it influenced political elections. Hamburg, then, could only be
defined as a massacre because it was fundamentally political violence.32
Just as predictably white Carolinians blamed the black militia for starting the riot,
and Southern white newspapers created images of riotous blacks to contest black
descriptions. These stories uplifted whites as victims who only resulted to violence for
self-defense. A paralleled theme existed in numerous newspaper articles that depicted
blacks as rioters and whites as peace keepers. For instance, the Anderson Intelligencer
reported a story about a “riot’ in Charleston, also in 1876 “A bloody and disgraceful riot
was inaugurated in the city of Charleston by a mob of infurious Republican negroes, who
were determined to kill some colored Democrats who had organized a Democratic Club.”
It read, “The white people were informed of the plan, and for the purpose of escorting the
colored men home, formed a procession with six white men around each colored
Democrat, and marched up King street in safety.”33 The language is so similar to articles
about Hamburg that substituting the word “Hamburg” for “Charleston” would not seem
out of place.
In fact, whites called every black disturbance a riot, including the Ellenton Riot,
Charleston Riot, and Ned Tennant Riot. In each of these events, blacks were murdered
by whites, who were never punished for their actions. And because white Carolinians
seized control of the term, just as firmly as they seized control of the state, they were free
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afterwards to control the memory of the event. By the turn of the 20th century, of course,
white memory had become dominant. The remembrance of Hamburg had evolved to the
point where black memory had been largely suppressed. But that was not a given.
Suppression was immediately contested.
Immediately after Hamburg, as the massacre was publicized in newspapers
around the nation, more attention was brought to the racial violence in South Carolina.
Black Carolinians pleaded the U.S. government for help. They also sought justice. White
southerners purposely used racial terror as a tool to regain power throughout the South,
they argued. “We (black Carolinians) invoke the consideration of this whole nation and
the powers of the Federal Government,” some were quoted in the New York Times, “to
see to it that the equal protection under this Government be maintained throughout this
nation. . . so that safety to life and property, and the right to vote as a conscience and
dictate to every citizen shall be forever secured to all throughout this freed land.”34 They
feared—correctly, as it turned out—that racial violence would ultimately be used to strip
them not merely of their political power but of the civil and political rights they had
gained during Reconstruction.
Events would show, though, that if Hamburg was a national story, only black
Carolinians believed it was a national issue. Black Carolinians used two arguments in
trying to convince the nation to provide help. The first was that black Carolinians would
be unable to protect themselves against more and maybe bloodier violence without the
aid of the federal government; the second claimed that the Hamburg violence would have
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a political impact throughout the nation. Black politicians such as Richard H. Cain and
Robert Smalls used their positions in order to build a broader platform against racial
violence of the South. However, they ran up against other politicians who claimed to be
skeptical about involving the national government in so-called “state” issues. This divide
would also ultimately influence the memory of the event.
In July 1876, black Carolinians met in Charleston to protest the murders. The
speaker, Richard H. Cain, rejected the justifications of whites—that blacks started the
violence. Cain, before the war a minister and abolitionist in the North, was a leader of
stature who promoted black rights before and during Reconstruction. He moved to
Charleston to become involved in the new political system which promised black leaders
the chance to become politicians, and from 1868 to 1870 he served in the South Carolina
State Senate. In 1872 he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives where he
served until 1874. During the Hamburg meeting, Cain pointed out the hypocrisies of the
white Carolinians’ justifications. He offered a hypothetical scenario in which two black
men interrupted a group of whites on parade. If the black men had tried to push
through—as the white men of Hamburg had done—the white men would have refused to
let them pass: and would have violently punished the black men for trying. Neither would
the white Carolinians have let a group of black men take their guns away like the white
Carolinians tried to do with the black militia. And yet the blacks at Hamburg acted
completely differently. So, Cain argued, the white men could not possibly think or use
these justifications as credible ones. 35
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The perpetrators needed to be punished. Though Reconstruction was coming to
an end, as were the social advancements made by blacks, black Carolinians believed that
as a group they could make sure the white Carolinians were held accountable for the
murder of innocent blacks. “The negro in this country will not always be docile,” Cain
argued. “The rising generation are as brave and daring as white men. Already that spirit
is taking deep root in the minds of thousands who have nothing to lose in the contest, and
who would rejoice in the opportunity to sacrifice their lives for their liberty.”36 Of course
it can be argued that the “rising generation” of daring black men were exactly what
Carolina whites feared the most.
Smalls was another influential black leader who brought Hamburg to national
attention. Smalls’ life illustrated the advancement of blacks during Reconstruction. He
was born a slave in 1839 but escaped during the Civil War. Smalls grew up as a house
slave, but learned different skills which allowed him to work a variety of jobs. These had
included waiter, lamplighter, stevedore, and foreman in Charleston harbor. While he
worked for John Simmons, a rigger in Charleston, Smalls learned how to sail. Despite
paying part of his income to his owner, Smalls earned a living performing these special
skills, and even saved enough money before the war to purchase his wife, Hanna Jones,
and daughter, Elizabeth Lydia. But he never had to use that money because he escaped
with his family—famously, in 1862, by piloting a boat called The Planter out of
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Charleston harbor—to freedom during the Civil War.37 After the war, he served in the
U.S. House of Representatives from 1874 to 1879 then again from1881 to 1887.
In 1876 Smalls fought against a bill meant to remove Federal troops from the
South and station them instead in the Western states and territories. Smalls argued that
troops should not be removed from South Carolina as long as blacks needed protection.
To bring attention to the racial violence black Carolinians faced, he read aloud in the
House a letter that he received describing the Hamburg Massacre from an eyewitness.
The debate over Smalls’ proposed amendment was contentious. Predictably, some were
not sympathetic to black Carolinians, for instance Congressman Julian Hartridge, from
Georgia, who blamed the blacks for the incident. Other Congressmen questioned the
validity of the letter because Smalls refused to state the name of its author to protect him
from white retribution. Congressman Joseph Rainey, of South Carolina, however,
defended Smalls’ request by again pointing out the irony of white arguments. The New
York Times described Rainey’s speech: “He charged that nowhere would men be
permitted to drive a wagon through the ranks of a military procession, and because a
South Carolina militia company would not break ranks to permit two chivalric gentlemen
of ancient ancestry to pass, the surrender of their arms was demanded by persons who
had no right to make the demand, no authority to receive the surrender, and they were
shot down by an armed mob because they dared to refuse.”38 Rainey used phrases such
as “chivalric gentleman” and “ancient ancestry” to mock the white Southerners who often
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thought of themselves as gallant knights from Sir Walter Scott novels—but who were, in
reality, merely leaders and members of “an armed mob.”
For some congressmen the violence in South Carolina was an issue of local law
and order, not a political demonstration of terrorism aimed at the heart of Reconstruction.
These congressmen claimed that Hamburg was an example of local violence and should
be dealt with at a local level. Congressman Omar D. Conger, from Michigan, argued that
if the army was divided policing all the violence within states, no army would be left to
defend the frontier. They did not notice and maybe by 1876 did not care to notice the
impact that racial violence would have on the South politically. However Smalls
understood the racial violence would influence black southerners’ rights. Without the
Federal government’s help, he believed that more violence would occur in South
Carolina, as it did.
When the racial violence at Hamburg and the future of Reconstruction were
considered national issues, the context was narrowly political and partisan. Numerous
newspapers, for instance, argued that Hamburg was an event of national importance
because it would impact the presidential election involving Rutherford B. Hayes and
Samuel J. Tilden. Republicans used Hamburg as a reason to vote against Tilden since he
was in the same political party as the white Carolinians involved at Hamburg. For
instance, a writer in the Ohio Gallipolis Journal argued, “I do say that the worst wards,
the worst States, are the Democratic States. I do say that the Hamburg murderers are
supporters of Tilden and Hendricks. I do say that the haters of liberty- the assassins of
colored men, women, children- the masked wretches who ride to hunt of the freeman and
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shoot him down like a beast, disregarding the prayers and tears of wife and children, I do
say that these men are not for Hayes and Wheeler.”39 But the rhetoric of injustice was
often deployed as an instrument of political gain, and Democrats were all too happy to
point this out. As The New Orleans Republic explained, “The massacre of colored
citizens at Hamburg in South Carolina continues to excite deeply the public mind, not so
much on account of the occurrence itself as because of its peculiar relations and because
of the year in which it occurred. . . This is a presidential year.”40 Writer E.L. Godkin
warned readers in The Nation that they should be weary of Republicans “waving the
bloody shirt,” which was the colloquial term used to describe Republican attempts to
capitalize on instances of violence in the South. Godkin condemned the actions of the
white men at Hamburg but claimed that the event should not be used to impact the
election. “To vote for Hayes, for instance, without regard to other considerations, merely
to show Southerners that we disapprove of such conduct,” he wrote, “would be little short
of folly.”41
Congressman Oliver Morton, of Indiana, wanted to print copies of President
Grant’s message about Hamburg to hand out in the Senate, because he was shocked to
hear that Tilden had not acknowledged Hamburg in his public letters. But Morton’s tactic
only highlighted the political nature of silence. Why should Tilden comment on it, asked
the The Illinois Daily Argus? America was a violent place. Nothing special attended
those deaths. Hamburg was a local problem so Tilden and Hayes did not have to
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comment on it. “The reason why Tilden and Hayes made no reference to the Hamburg
massacre is that it did not call for a reference from them. The massacre of Custer’s
command was a much more serious affair, but Tilden and Hendricks did not refer even to
it. The Molly Maguire riots in Pennsylvania were quite as important, and Hayes and
Wheeler did not reference them. The Hamburg tragedy was a local affair; it took place in
a state over which the two northern governors have no authority.”42 Of course, that too
was cynically calculating. Those mere “northern Governors” were running for the
presidency of the United States, and one would soon be responsible for Reconstruction.
Congressmen who supported the printing of Grant’s response to Hamburg argued
that if more people understood what happened, it was more likely that something would
be done about it. They argued that the black Carolinians could not defend themselves
against white Carolinians without national help because the violence was unlike other
violence throughout the country: namely it had a political purpose. “It was true there
were murders in the Northern States, sometimes for gain, sometimes for passion,
sometimes on account of hate, but there were no murders committed to control the
politics of the state,” Senator Allen Thurman, from Ohio, argued.43 Thurman supported
Morton’s claim that “these papers showed the importance of spreading the matter before
the American people. A terrorism now existed in South Carolina and nearly every other
Southern State, which prevented punishment for killing a negro.”44
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The matter of whether Hamburg should be considered a local or national problem
effectively ended after the election of Wade Hampton in November of 1876. Southern
Democrats in South Carolina, as elsewhere over time, had “redeemed” their power in
state governments, reestablished control over politics, and ultimately eliminated the
political, civil, and social advancements of blacks. The outcome that black Carolinians
had feared became a reality. They not only had no power to protect themselves from
further violence, but none to protect themselves against non-lethal forms of intimidation
and discrimination. One of those non-lethal forms was the development of heroic white
memory.
As early as 1877 it was common for South Carolina’s white newspapers to judge
a white candidate’s qualifications by assessing his role at Hamburg. That trend is most
evident in Matthew Butler’s election to the U.S Senate in 1877. While some used the
term massacre to condemn him for his actions, those who supported him urged that the
event was a riot, and that he was a peacekeeper. It was important locally for his political
career that he was at Hamburg, but he also wanted to defend his national reputation. The
national backlash against Butler over Hamburg when he attempted to assume his Senate
seat even forced him to begin denying his participation to a national audience. The New
Orleans Daily Democrat defended Butler in terms he would have appreciated. ”Time and
again,” the newspaper recorded, “it was fully and clearly shown that General Butler, so
far from having instigated the Hamburg riot was in the highest sense a peacemaker, and
did all in his power to prevent the bloody affair.”45
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Indeed, several sitting Senators did not support admitting Butler to the Senate.
Senator Roscoe Conkling, from New York, was particularly outspoken in his
disapproved. “Conkling, in the forty-first congress, made one of his most daring
speeches against the admission of Butler to a seat in the senate, an account of his alleged
connection with the Hamburg massacre,” one newspaper reported. “He boldly denounced
him as a murderer, and in a manner which sent a thrill through every listener in the
crowded galleries, Conkling thundered out: ‘And now he comes here with his hands
dripping with human gore, demanding a seat in this body.’”46 Other senators supported
denying Butler by claiming he was a murderer. Those against him claimed “it may be
said that a State has a right to choose any one, no matter how base, to represent it in the
Senate. But the Senate has a right to reject criminals, and the right of a State to choose
any one it pleases does not include the right to free criminals from the grasp of justice
and thrust them into the highest councils of the nation.”47
The News and Herald of South Carolina took note of Butler’s controversial
national image but defended his actions. “No one supposes that the Democratic
Legislature of South Carolina either would or could please the Northern Radicals in their
choice of a United States Senator. General Butler is known to us all as one of the most
moderate and Conservative men in South Carolina, and knowing this fact, it is not
necessary for us to enlarge upon it.”48 In reply to the accusations against him, Butler
argued, “It is true that I have been charged with instigating the Hamburg riot, by those
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who had a political end to accomplish by so charging me, but I had no more to do with
instigating that riot than you had, and no more to do with killing the negroes than you
had.”49 Another newspaper article quoted a companion of Butler who claimed, “About
that affair, by the way, Butler told me that he was not at Hamburg and did not know
anything about it till it was over.”50 Butler himself was quoted as saying “I had no more
control over that mob than I would have over a northeast hurricane. I did try as long as I
could to prevent what outrages I could, but it would have been impossible for me or any
other human being to control it.”51 Butler also described an encounter with Governor
Chamberlain after the affair in which Chamberlain supported Butler’s claim that he did
not participate in the massacre. Butler even defined Hamburg as murder: “Certainly, that
is murder. There is not civilized man can justify that thing, but I had no control over
it.”52
Of course, Butler’s claim of powerlessness in the face of a “hurricane” was
specious. This was no white mob at Hamburg—but a highly organized, paramilitary
presence, and also by its quasi-military character the means by which white violence took
on the redemptive, heroic quality of saving the State from the black mob. For that matter,
crowds of white men apparently could, actually, be controlled. Hampton had famously
“controlled” a white mob on the steps of the State House in 1877, and as will be
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described shortly, Butler and Benjamin Ryan Tillman both did so in Edgefield seventeen
years later during a political campaign rally.
By 1894, by which time the shadow of Jim Crow was lengthening, whites were
freer to argue over the nature of their heroic narrative. Where fault lines existed in white
memory, they tended to involve class issues, and they developed over time. Butler was
associated with the chivalric Democratic southern class, elements of which were
particularly strong in South Carolina, so he claimed that he showed restraint at Hamburg.
But Butler’s opponent in the 1894 election for the U.S. Senate, Benjamin Ryan Tillman,
took the opposite tack. Tillman celebrated his role in the massacre in order to show that
he was a heroic man of action—not a peacemaker or a supporter of restraint. He also
seized upon the term riot as the proper way to define it. “Have any of you ever heard of
the Hamburg riot?” he asked rhetorically at a convention in 1893. “I do not suppose there
is a man who has not, because it was heralded all over the Union and held up as a typical
southern outrage. . . I am a Hamburg rioter, and I desire to ask if you would take me to be
a man who would murder negroes in cold blood and without provocation?”53 By this
time, most South Carolina whites supported Tillman’s view of the event. One newspaper
called out others who still used the term massacre as hypocrites. “Those who have harped
on the Hamburg and Ellenton riots- massacres, they termed them- may now realize, since
the matter has been brought to their own doors that rare antipathy is a real and living
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issue, and that when the clash comes Northerners are just as apt to kill negroes in riot
blood as southerners.”54
The Abbeville Press and Banner acknowledged the importance of Hamburg in
state politics. “I am very curious to know, “one correspondent wrote, “what will finally
become a recommendation for office in South Carolina. Our politics have already
reached that point when one’s presence and participation in the Hamburg riot is the sinqua-non to the highest office within the gift of the people.”55 The memory of the event at
Hamburg became even more notorious as Tillman and Butler engaged in a spirited
contest for the Senate seat in the summer and fall of 1894. “The Democracy of the
Palmetto State has never enjoyed such lively times,” the Arizona Weekly reported, “since
the days of the Hamburg massacre.”56 By this time, the white Carolinians involved at
Hamburg were viewed as heroes and it was important for Butler and Tillman to remind
voters of their actions. The election caught the attention of national newspapers because
of the controversial reputation of both men who could have influence over national issues
when elected. For instance, the Arizona Weekly that captured the campaign’s essence.
“The Democratic joint canvass in South Carolina goes on with unabated vigor and
theatrical effect,” the newspaper reported. “Governor Tillman misses no opportunity to
call Senator Butler various sorts of liar and villain, while the Senator eagerly takes
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advantage of every occasion to denounce the Governor as a fraud of many different
varieties and a hypocrite of innumerable shades and grades.”57
Butler and Tillman appealed to different followers. Butler was viewed by
Tillman’s supporters as an aristocratic Carolinian who was part of the class that Tillman
wanted to remove from power. Tillman’s followers were typically middle-class farmers
who were underrepresented before the Civil War. The Laurens Advertiser distinguished
between the followers humorously: “The men in the audience yelled for Tillman and the
pretty women on the piazza clapped their hands and waved their fans for Butler.”58
Women on the piazza could be assumed to be stereotyped “ladies,” not hardworking farm
wives, who instead of yelling just “clapped their hands and waved their fans.” With that
comment the newspaper was making light of the class Butler represented. Stephen
Kantrowitz argues that Tillman thought of the aristocratic class as “un-manly,
unproductive, urban aristocrats,” who, according to Tillman, “hardly embodied the kind
of white manhood that could lead the commonwealth through troubled times.”59 Tillman
often referred to the Democratic Party that was dominated by aristocrats as “that
interesting old lady.” He argued that the “old lady” was hurting the growth of Carolinian
farmers. Under his leadership, on the other hand, the party could become a “nurturing
household member with an important role in the process of social and economic
regeneration.”60 Although women could not vote, gender became a way to call attention
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to each candidate’s masculinity, and the question of each man’s involvement at
Hamburg—the sheer physicality of action there—was intertwined with those dynamics.
Tillman had used his involvement with Hamburg throughout his political career,
including his successful campaign for governor in 1890. According to Kantrowitz, it was
important for Tillman to remind white Carolinians of his actions during Reconstruction
since he did not fight in the Civil War. “In the 1880s,” Kantrowitz argues, “when most
leading Democrats could point to a Confederate war record, the memory and legacy of
1876 served Tillman extremely well. Tillman’s Red-shirt service became evident of his
personal courage, but more important . . . his boundless commitment to white male
authority.”61 At a Farmers Alliance meeting in Charleston in 1888, “B.R. Tillman made a
personal and abusive speech . . . that would reflect little credit on anyone,” one
newspaper reported, aware that lowcountry, aristocratic Charleston was often a target of
Tillman’s abuse. “He termed that the people of Charleston arrant cowards, and blamed
them for ‘not even killing a nigger,’ boasting that he had participated in the Hamburg
affair.”62 Tillman indeed boasted at the meeting. “I believe, before Almighty God, that
but for that Hamburg riot Chamberlain would have been governor of South Carolina and
the state as safe today for the republicans as Vermont or Massachusetts,” he said. “I
proclaim it loud that I was one of the Hamburg rioters who dared even the devil to save
the state.”63 Tillman’s political campaigns helped to memorialize Hamburg as a heroic
moment for white Carolinians.
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Tillman gained a large following during his time as governor and had even
established a larger movement and political machine to which he had lent his name.
Butler needed to undermine Tillman’s reputation in order to compete with him. During
their canvass in 1894, Butler claimed that Tillman was not at Hamburg when the fighting
began. He also claimed that he had a list of men who supported his accusation. Tillman,
Butler said, was “not to be found” when the fighting at Hamburg began.64 The
accusation was an attack on Tillman’s honor, as Francis Butler Simkins argues. “In other
words, Tillman was told that he was a coward, a bulldozer, a liar, and a bribe taker!”
Simkins writes. “It was a series of insults which thousands of South Carolinians believed
could be honorably met only by bloodshed.”65 (The term bulldozer is derived from the
physical abuse of slaves: “bulldozed” blacks were punished with severe beatings or
whippings, in “doses fit only for a bull.”) Uncharacteristically, however, Tillman
remained calm as Butler castigated him, which kept his supporters from rioting against
Butler.
Tillman responded by claiming to have a list of fifty men who saw him at
Hamburg during the fighting. How effective such lists might have been in establishing
credibility is debatable. Most white Carolinians probably supported Tillman’s claim
because he was always outspoken about his involvement at Hamburg. Unlike Tillman,
Butler tried to downplay his involvement in the violence while in the U.S. Senate from
1877 to 1894. As one newspaper described the difference, Tillman “was not ashamed of
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having been at Hamburg, though General Butler did get ashamed and denied he had been
there when he was trying to get a seat in the Senate.”66 The context explains why
Tillman did not resort to violence against Butler for making claims against his honor.
Tillman understood that it was well established in the community—the ultimate judge of
all things honorable and dishonorable--that he had been at Hamburg. He did not have to
“take” Butler’s lie. Ultimately, it was not a threat to his reputation and therefore it could
not shame him.
Butler’s denial of involvement during the controversy over his assumption of the
Senate seat in 1877 hurt him badly in 1894 when white Carolinians partial to Tillman
remembered his remarks. At Edgefield, as Butler debated Tillman, a riot almost occurred
when an audience member brought the discrepancy into the open. A local newspaper
described the tension at the event. “I have seen trouble in crowds before. I have seen the
eyes of men dance and muscles quiver,” he wrote. “I have seen the hand go to the pistol
pocket, the glimmer of the bright weapon and the smoke clear away after the trigger was
pulled, but I have never seen wilder or more ferocious expressions in the eyes of human
beings than was exhibited here today. I looked at any moment to see a short fired and to
see the fray commence.”67 The Anderson Intelligencer also noted the tension. “The
trouble occurred during Senator Butler’s speech, and was caused by the denunciation by
Butler of a man who had insulted him by saying that he had denied his participation in
the Hamburg riot at Washington.”68 The crowd was outraged with Butler for calling his
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accuser a liar, but quelled by both candidates before violence ensued. As one newspaper
noted, “General Butler quickly recovered his wits and worked masterfully to check the
riot which seemed imminent. Tillman did likewise. Each appealed to men of both sides
to stop jowering. They begged those trying to get on the stand to stay off and those who
were already on to get off.”69 Both Tillman and Butler calmed themselves down in order
to set an example for the crowd. Butler continued his speech and at the end presented a
certificate signed by men who claimed that Tillman was not at Hamburg. In response,
Tillman produced his own certificate with names of more people who insisted that he was
there. Several men from the crowd, who were at Hamburg but were not on Tillman’s
certificate, shouted in support of Tillman. It was obvious to one newspaper that Butler
could not compete with Tillman’s supporters.70
It is an ironic but also telling aside that Carolinians used the term riot to describe
the threat of violence during the debate—a riot here being a political disturbance which
reflected positively on the independence of white men and their inability to be bulldozed.
“Riot,” of course, had been their preferred term in ennobling their violence at Hamburg
and defending their conduct, while blaming “mob violence” on black Carolinians...
Tillman defeated Butler in the election, and served in the Senate until his death in
1918. During his time in office, Hamburg was brought up on numerous occasions.
Tillman never denied or belittled his participation. He understood Hamburg’s
incandescent memory in South Carolina’s political culture, and he openly celebrated his
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involvement. And from Tillman’s memory of the massacre—one of redemptive, heroic,
masculine violence—white Carolinians sought to commemorate Hamburg with the
creation of the Meriwether monument in 1916. Though Tillman was not directly
involved in the monument, his celebration of Hamburg created a heroic memory of the
event that white Carolinians wanted to ennoble permanently, as part of the foundation of
white supremacy.
In fact, to focus too much on Tillman and Butler is to obscure what the
Meriwether monument ultimately represented. It represented a white story that was
remarkably well shaped and durable very shortly after Hamburg, and long before the
story became durable as the moment itself. And it was the ordinary white Carolinians
who were involved at Hamburg—not just their leaders—who came to be celebrated
within the state.
Indeed, despite the calls for justice both locally and nationally immediately after
Hamburg, especially those of black leaders like Smalls and Cain, none of the white men
responsible for the murders were punished for the crime. A coroner’s inquest in
August1876 resolved that E. J. Butler, Henry Getson, Thomas Butler, Harrison Butler,
John Lamar, Thomas Oliver, and John Oliver murdered the black men.71 (A coroner’s
inquest was the first step of the judicial process; it was used to gather evidence and
interview witnesses in order to determine the cause a death within a county. Prince Rivers
had organized an inquest on July 9th after finding the bodies of six black men in the
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streets of Hamburg.) Along with these seven, forty-four men of Aiken County, S.C,
thirteen of Edgefield County, S.C., and thirty Georgians were found to have participated
in the attack.72 The inquest named names: “Moses Parks came to his death at Hamburg,
in Aiken County, on the night of the 8th of July last at the hands of Robert J. Butler. That
James Cook came to his death at the hands of Henry Getsen, Thomas Butler, and
Harrison Butler. A. T. Attaway, David Phillips, Hampton Stevens and Albert Mignard, at
the hands of Thomas Oliver, John Oliver and John Lamar and others, unknown to the
jury, and that the remaining men were accused generally as being present as accessories
before the fact.”73 Eyewitnesses at the hearing included many blacks from Hamburg,
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including Rivers, the town’s Trial Justice, who claimed that he tried to stop the violence
by urging the black militia to accept the demands of the white Carolinians.74 Maybe he
had done so, as well, as a means of self-defense; he must have understood that as a wellknown black leader and former Union soldier he was a target. In fact he fled the town
before the white Carolinians could harm him, though his house was broken into and
vandalized.
If accusing and naming the murderers was a form of fairness and justice, it was
also fleeting. At a second hearing the white Carolinians presented a rebuttal in which
they introduced into the legal record the same claims they had been making in
newspapers and public opinion. They blamed the racial tension that led to the violence on
the black militia. D. S. Henderson, who had himself participated at Hamburg, brought
three black men to testify that Doc Adams and Allan Attaway had asked them to join the
militia with the purpose of killing white men.75 George Henderson, one of the black men,
claimed that “he and Jerry Merriwether, also colored, were asked in Hamburg by
Attaway to join a company he was getting up to kill out the whites.”76 According to the
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white Carolinians, the militia threatened the whites for weeks before Hamburg. They
claimed Doc Adams openly threatened several white men and challenged them to fight.
Once white Carolinians had created a false image of the black militia’s menace,
they blamed the militia for the deaths that occurred at Hamburg. According to a local
newspaper report, white Carolinians argued that “the shooting was commenced by the
negroes from the building where they were barricaded, and that young [McKie]
Meriwether was killed before a single shot was fired by the whites; that the negroes, for
days previous, had thrown out threats of determination to force a fight upon the whites;
that ammunition and cannon had been order by the negroes and stored in their armory
several days before the collision.”77 The white men argued that they came to Hamburg
only to support Butler and Getzen; they were not there, they said, to create violence. A.
P. Butler claimed at the hearing that “shortly after he arrived[,] firing commenced and a
general riot ensued, no one in particular leading. The disturbance lasted about one hour
and a half; that during the disturbance the deponent, with Gen. [Matthew C.] Butler, did
all they could to restrain the mob from violence of all kind.”78
Newspapers both locally and regionally were already prepared to support this
interpretation of events. One claimed, “The testimony shows that the negroes were a band
of thieves and murderers; that they had no right to bear arms under the militia laws of the
State; that they threatened to kill the whites; that they had for a long time so threated, and
had committed lawless acts; that in this case they defied the summons of a magistrate,
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and went to their armory, fully prepared to shed blood, and that they fired the first shot
and drew first blood.”79 The Memphis Daily argued: “For the attitude of the whites, as
the evidence now shows, there was good reason, if, indeed, the disarming of the negroes
was not an inexorable necessity, and we trust that the newspapers which laid before the
public the statements of the negroes and the evidence taken at the inquest, will, in
fairness to the accused, reproduce the later developments at the hearing before Judge
Maher last Thursday.”80
After hearing their arguments, Judge John Maher ordered the white Carolinians
“to give your bail and go quietly to your homes.” Each gave bonds of $1,000 and went
their way.81 According to the Anderson Intelligencer, “everything passed off quietly and
peaceably,” [and] “the men, with a commendable degree of decorum and dignity,
dispersed towards their homes.”82 In fact the white Carolinians were never convicted for
these crimes, and never served any time in for them. The charges against them were
dropped as part of a general pattern of political deal-making after Redemption. After his
contested election as governor in 1876, Wade Hampton created a committee to
investigate the corruption of the South Carolina Republican party during Reconstruction.
As a part of a deal to drop formal charges of corruption eventually brought by the
committee against Francis L. Cardozo, Robert Smalls, and L. Cass Carpenter,
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Republicans agreed not to pursue the murder charges against the white Carolinians
accused at Hamburg.83
Nevertheless, these hearings and their aftermath allowed the white Carolinians to
lay the groundwork of white memory of Hamburg. Newspapers around the South, for
example, only reported the false stories put on record by the white Carolinians. Most
newspapers in South did not include the black eyewitnesses’ points of view, so those
accounts were overshadowed by the white memory. Even the reports of the bail-giving
Carolinians going “quietly to their homes” after the inquest served a purpose, and
distorted the memory of Hamburg even further, since they depicted the white Carolinians
as peace-loving and orderly followers of the law. The major elements of the white heroic
memory, then, were largely in place in both the legal and historical records, as well as in
white public opinion, within six weeks of the Hamburg massacre
Of course the ultimate goal of the white Carolinians, which Hamburg certainly
served, was achieved with Hampton’s election. The efforts of Smalls and other
congressmen who had warned against white Democrats gaining power in South Carolina
were futile but prophetic. “It was true,” as Senator Morton of Indiana had said, that “there
were murders in the Northern states, sometimes for gain, sometimes for passion,
sometimes on account of hate, but there were not murders committed to control the
politics of the state.”84 Several of the white Carolinians involved at Hamburg ultimately
became political leaders within South Carolina, sometimes by taking the place of men
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who had been sympathetic to black justice. Robert Smalls and other black leaders lost
their positions.85 One newspaper even blamed the massacre on Smalls since it took place
in his district. It claimed Hamburg was planned in order that Smalls might unite blacks
to gain their votes.86
But the counter-revolution of Redemption was not only about office-holding and
power. It was not narrowly political. As white Carolinians increased their power and
control in the state, they were able to develop and use a story of revolutionary heroism at
Hamburg to help elect men who supported the heroic memory of white Carolinians at
Hamburg. Blacks found it impossible to challenge or alter the memory that white
Carolinians created for Hamburg. With political power, white Carolinians were able to
make a contested memory an official one. That memory would be celebrated for years to
come with the creation of the McKie Meriwether monument.
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CHAPTER TWO
CREATING A PERMANENT MEMORY
In 1916 with the creation of the McKie Meriwether monument, the white
Carolinian memory of Hamburg was set in stone, figuratively and literally. By this
period the southern landscape was brimming with monuments and statues honoring
Confederate soldiers. But very few, if any, represented the events or people of
Reconstruction. With race relations in the U.S. evolving, and with the start of World War
I, white Carolinians sought to retrieve their memory of Reconstruction. It was also the
time of the Dunning school, a development in the writing of history that impacted the
period profoundly. Dunning school historians, such as Claude Bowers87 wrote about the
“horrors” the South faced as the defeated region was “overrun” with northern
carpetbaggers and eager, office-seeking freedmen.
This version of history, like the version of Hamburg told by Carolina whites in
1876 and 1877, once again painted the South and white Southerners as victims, but the
reality was far from that deception. Having been shut out both from history writing and
from history as it was remembered in public commemorations, as the historian W.
Fitzhugh Brundage has shown. Black southerners were voiceless against the belittling
stereotype that was forced upon them from a one-sided history. The Meriwether
monument represents how southern history was manipulated in order to uplift the white
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southerners and forgot the horrors faced by black southerners—both in 1876, at
Hamburg, and at the time the monument was dedicated 40 years later.
The white memory of Hamburg became the permanent memory as a new
generation of southerners came to power in the late 1890s. David Goldfield describes
these men as a generation who venerated their fathers who fought for the Confederacy
during the Civil War and did not want that memory to remain untold. “Unlike their
fathers and grandfathers,” Goldfield argues, “they had not fought heroic battles, made
supreme sacrifices, or redeemed a prostrate region from Yankee and black rule. . . They
grew up in the shadow of giants—heroes and Redeemers.”88 As Goldfield explains,
“Honor was to remember and follow the examples of those who sacrificed,” and white
southerners used this sense of honor to create a southern landscape based solely on white
experience.89
Some events were remembered during this period through large commemorations,
such as the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg in 1913. Northern and
southern veterans joined together to honor those who had died at the battle. The
importance of this gathering was not what was discussed, but what was overlooked.
Slavery’s role in the war, to say nothing of the current issues of race relations, were
avoided during this celebration. David Blight argues that the white North and South
deliberately put aside the major issue of the war in order to reconcile themselves to the
other. “Neither space nor time was allowed at Gettysburg for considering the causes,
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transformation, and results of the war; no place was reserved for the legacies of
emancipation or the conflicted and unresolved history of Reconstruction,” Blight argues.
“Because the planners had allowed no space for surviving black veterans, they had also
left no space on the programs for a discussion of that second great outcome of the war—
the failures of radical reconstruction.”90 It seemed that in both northern and southern
history there was no place for black memory.
That was partly because the regional story of Reconstruction had become the
national one. From 1889 to 1909, for instance, Ben Tillman traveled around the nation
and presented his so-called “race talks.” The major theme of these talks was the
inferiority of blacks to whites. Francis Butler Simkins quotes Tillman as insisting to his
audiences that blacks were “so near akin to the monkey that scientists are yet looking for
the missing link.”91 For Tillman, as Steven Kantrowitz has shown, Reconstruction was
not a dead event. It was an ever-present memory because it was ever-present as a
renewable threat. Tillman opposed blacks ever again gaining power in the South,
especially power over whites. During these talks, Tillman blamed Reconstruction for
“demoralizing” the blacks.92 He argued that blacks were better off under the restraints of
slavery; without it blacks had become more barbaric. “Tillman was firmly convinced that
Reconstruction was one of the most horrible experiences recorded in history,” Simkins
argues. “It had so demoralized the Negro that he could never recover the virtues of the
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slave.”93 Tillman’s ideas gave him national attention and, even though some may not
have agreed with his beliefs, his ideas influenced the memory of Reconstruction.
According to K. Stephen Prince, racial speeches similar to Tillman’s influenced
the creation of southern identity. Prince claims that after the Civil War, northerners and
southerners created the ideas of the South through stories, whether using literary,
theatrical performance, or speeches such as Tillman’s. To control blacks, white
southerners created a false image of them in their stories and promoted these stereotypes
around the nation. Many of these stories, as Prince points out, were created to entertain
northern audiences, and they did. Prince claims, “To fail to recognize the extent to which
the nation at large engaged with and participated in the destruction of African American
rights is to give the North a pass on one of the most unsavory aspects of American
history.”94 Tillman’s stories depicted blacks as violent rapists, while whites were viewed
as innocent bystanders who only resorted to violence in order to defend themselves.
These stories uplifted whites as heroes for protecting other whites, especially women. Of
note is that supposed rape or threatened brutality to white women was not used as a
justification for Hamburg at the time. Dubious claims such as these, instead, were used
later to justify the memory of Hamburg. People around the nation believed these stories,
which ultimately helped to support the whitewashing of southern history, especially the
memory of the Hamburg massacre.95
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In 1909, Tillman recounted the events at Hamburg to a group of fifteen thousand
people at the Red Shirt Reunion in Anderson, South Carolina.96 His speech was later
published as a pamphlet titled The Struggles of 1876. The reason for the speech, Tillman
said, was his fear of President William Howard Taft’s efforts to reconsolidate the South
within the Republican Party. Tillman reminded the audience at the reunion of the
“troubles” faced during Reconstruction and how the heroic Red Shirts overcame them.
“The rising generation has been taught that we have no race problem and that there is no
possible danger from the negroes now;” Tillman said, raising the specter of a renewed
Reconstruction, “and many young men and some old ones need to be told of the
tyrannies, oppressions and robberies to which the white people of the state had to submit
because of the bad government put in power by northern bayonets using ignorant negro
votes.”97 Similar to others in the new leading generation of southerners, Tillman was
unwilling to let white Carolinians forget the memory of Reconstruction.
By this period Tillman was an extremely popular political leader of South
Carolina. The Country Record reported that 15,000 visitors came from around South
Carolina to hear Tillman speak. The reunion started with a parade at eleven that included
four thousand men, women, and children wearing red shirts. The first speaker was
former Governor John Calhoun Sheppard, who recalled the brave accomplishments of the
Red Shirts to the younger audience members.98 Tillman spoke after Sheppard about the
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threat of Taft’s move to rebuild the Republican party in the South. He then recounted the
story of Hamburg. “Senator Tillman was given an ovation when introduced and
throughout his speech there was considerable applause,” The Country Recorded reported
“The audience was with him from start to finish and every utterance, especially when
sarcasm was used or when an attack was made, brought forth yells upon yell.”99 The
sheer number of the audience suggests how successful white Carolinians had been at
manipulating the memory of Reconstruction. Unlike the election debates of the 1890s,
nobody questioned or challenged anything the speakers said.
Tillman boldly discussed the plan of the white Carolinians to take back power in
South Carolina during Reconstruction by force. “It had been the settled purpose of the
leading white men of Edgefield to seize the first opportunity that the negroes might offer
to provoke a riot and teach the negroes a lesson;” Tillman said, “as it was generally
believed that nothing but bloodshed and a good deal of it could answer the purpose of
redeeming the state from negro and carpet bag rule.”100 As with the earliest justifications,
Tillman blamed the black militia for instigating the trouble that led to the massacre. He
claimed that the militia purposely blocked the road and charged at Butler and Getzen.
According to Tillman the white Carolinians only came to Hamburg in support of Butler
and Getzen’s trial. Tillman argued that it was not until after the trial was postponed that
the white Carolinians wanted the militia to hand over their guns in order to restore order
in Hamburg.
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But what was forthright was Tillman’s refusal to belittle that white Carolinians
sought violence, or his striking admission that whites both wanted bloodshed and even
needed it for Redemption. Throughout the speech, Tillman’s descriptions of the white
Carolinians at Hamburg were similar to an elegy for an army. In these remarks, Tillman
revealed that it was not just a moment of self-defense, but rather a planned attack. The
white Carolinians even had a cannon with them.
As the Fort Mill Times stated, “Senator Tillman was particularly interesting in his
remarks touching that memorable period in the State’s history, and what he had to say
was listened to with the closest attention.”101 To Meriwether Tillman ascribed both a
martyr’s death and a soldier’s death. Meriwether was a young hero who in Tillman’s
telling sacrificed himself for his father: he took the place of his father in the front line
before the firing commenced. But in the speech Meriwether also became the quasiConfederate soldier who dies in the war of Reconstruction, “If young Meriwether had not
lost his life I do not think any of these last negroes would have been killed,” Tillman
argued, “but the purpose of our visit to Hamburg was to strike terror, and the next
morning when the negroes who had fled to the swamp returned to town (some of them
never did return, but kept on going) the ghastly sight which met their gaze of seven dead
negroes lying stark and stiff, certainly had its effect.”102 Neither Tillman nor his
followers named the six black men who were murdered and no one described the actual
horrors that white Carolinians had inflicted on the blacks.
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Tillman was also one of the first Carolinians to suggest the creation of a
monument dedicated to the men, like Meriwether, who fought in the war of
Reconstruction. As early as 1894 Tillman suggested the creation of a monument to honor
those who gave white redemption to South Carolina. Such a monument would be “a
fitting capstone to the triumphal arch which the common people have erected to liberty,
progress and Anglo-Saxon civilization since 1890.”103 In suggesting a monument
Tillman was part of a broader effort across the white South to capture and control
historical memory in public spaces. Prior to the 1900s, as W. Fitzhugh Brundage has
shown, monuments were created to honor Confederate soldiers but were promoted by
women’s groups like the Ladies’ Memorial Association and the United Daughters of the
Confederacy. By the early twentieth century, the impetus had shifted to men, and white
southerners urged state and local governments to build or subsidize monuments. As
Brundage describes, “In the first decade of the twentieth century, however, a coalition of
white hereditary societies and patriotic groups, historical enthusiasts, and professional
historians urged that the state actively promote public appreciation of history.”104 Unlike
Reconstruction, when many Confederate monuments were built, white men had complete
control over the government during the early 1900s. This allowed local and state
governments to become involved in memorializing southern history based on white
experience.
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The McKie Meriwether monument was one of these new monuments. It was an
idea created by white men but funded by the state. However, the man responsible for the
creation of the Meriwether monument was not Tillman but James Pickens DeLaughter,
who pushed for the monument in the South Carolina legislature. DeLaughter believed
that the life of Meriwether should be remembered as an example of white heroes who
sacrifices their lives during Reconstruction.
There is not much available biographical information about DeLaughter, so the
memory of his life is tied with the creation of this monument. He was born on October
20, 1866 in South Carolina. His father was James Pickens DeLaughter Sr., a Confederate
soldier. Later, he married Lillie Hightower and had four children. At the time of his
death in 1915, his oldest daughter was in school at Winthrop College. An obituary later
described him: “His rugged honesty, generous nature, uncompromising devotion to duty,
whether as a private citizen or a public servant caused Col. DeLaughter to be highly
esteemed throughout the county.”105 Within the Edgefield community, he was a member
of the Meriwether Agricultural Club. Another important fact about DeLaughter was his
service as the general of the Sweetwater Light Dragoons, a section of the second
regiment of cavalry in the South Carolina militia. He was elected colonel of the regiment
in 1897, on the eve of the Spanish-American War.
DeLaughter’s life spanned the time that resulted in white farmers seizing political
power in South Carolina, and Edgefield was long known for producing state leaders. As
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Orville Vernon Burton argues, “(Edgefieldians) saw themselves as representative of
South Carolina and of the South, and they self-consciously articulated and acted upon
what they believed to be the southern ideals.”106 Edgefield produced two Civil War
governors, Francis W. Pickens and Milledge Luke Bonham, two Confederate generals
involved in the redemption of Reconstruction, Matthew C. Butler and Martin W. Gary,
and two prominent political leaders, Ben Tillman and J. Strom Thurmond.107 DeLaughter
was not as notorious as these other men, but his political success is an example of the
political influence of even the lesser-known Edgefieldians.
In 1912, DeLaughter announced his candidacy for the South Carolina House of
Representatives, claiming it was due to the “urgent solicitations of friends in all parts of
the county.”108 A newspaper described his campaign, “The high place upon which he
pitched his campaign, together with the outspoken and fearless manner in which he
discussed the issues then before the public, caused the people to rally about him, the
result being that notwithstanding the fact that he resided in a remote corner of the county,
he led the ticket, being elected on the first ballot over all competitors.”109 He
immediately began pushing for the creation of the monument. In 1913, he asked the
legislature for four hundred dollars to fund it, a resolution eventually passed by both the
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South Carolina house and the senate.110 The senate commissioned G.W Medlock, W. H
Hammond, J. A Butler, George Adams, and J. McKie to supervise the creation of the
monument. In order to obtain more funds, newspapers around Edgefield and elsewhere
asked for donations. “A member of the commission which was appointed by the
legislature has called our attention to the fact that this amount is not adequate for the
erection of a creditable monument and has suggested that individual citizens make
contributions to this fund,” The Edgefield Advertiser reported in 1914. “The Advertiser
very heartily endorses the suggestion and we will receive contributions for this purpose
and forward to the commission, publishing the names and amounts.”111 It was clear,
then, that the community supported DeLaughter in the creation of this monument.
More trouble beyond inadequate funding soon appeared. In 1914, Governor
Coleman Blease vetoed the four hundred dollars committed by the legislature. It is
somewhat surprising that Blease vetoed a monument to support white Carolinian history;
no records indicate his reason. But one of the main reasons for his veto may have been
his relationship with Tillman. Blease and Tillman feuded often during Blease’s political
career, with Blease often referring to Tillman as “a liar and ingrate.”112 After Tillman’s
death, the South Carolina Senate published a volume of memorial addresses dedicated to
Tillman. Blease vandalized the book and wrote his own opinions of Tillman in the front
pages. “I knew him personally from 1888 until his death and was in consensus,
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conventions and personal meetings with him,” Blease wrote on the inside of the book,
“and he was always first for self and when he could no longer get favors from any one he
would betray them as the records fully show.”113
Things had not always been this way between them. Early in Blease’s career,
Tillman supported and endorsed Blease’s campaign for governor. But Blease supported a
different class of white southerners—not Tillman’s farmers. He favored instead the rise
of the white male mill workers and other small wage earners whom Tillman kept at a
wary arm’s length. Though these were different classes and kinds of white men, Blease
and Tillman held similar ideas on white supremacy and the rise of the poorer whites, at
least as those classes had been throttled by Carolina aristocrats. If anything, Blease was
even more outspoken on his racial ideas and even more vehement in his support of
lynching “But whereas Tillman had struggles to protect both white men’s prerogatives
and the rule of law,” Stephen Kantrowitz argues, “Blease made no bones about his
preference for violent self-assertion.”114
Tillman’s support of Blease began to fade after Blease was elected as governor of
South Carolina. Tillman openly rejected the similarities of Tillmanism and Bleasism and
attacked the new governor’s political initiatives. In 1914, Tillman fought against
Blease’s election for U.S. senator by trying to convince other politicians to run against
Blease. When nobody accepted the challenge, Tillman turned to the White House and
warned President Woodrow Wilson. He claimed that Blease would cause more problems
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for Wilson than Tillman did for Roosevelt.115 Ellison D. Smith ran against Blease and
defeated him in the election. When Blease lost, Tillman gloated in his successful
campaign. This was the same year that the state legislature was trying to pass the
Meriwether monument bill. Blease’s veto might have been because he was fighting
against Tillman and did not want to see a monument that honored an event Tillman not
only participated in, but wrapped his legacy within. Though the monument’s purpose
was to honor Meriwether, it also represented the other white Carolinians involved,
especially Tillman.
Though Blease tried to stop the monument, he was unsuccessful because of the
work of DeLaughter. DeLaughter fought to overturn Blease’s veto in the South Carolina
legislature. Newspapers reported that he made his first speech in two years in front of the
House to support his claim that Meriwether deserved to be remembered. He recounted
the events of Hamburg and argued that Meriwether gave his life for South Carolina: “He
was a hero. If it were not for him and others of his stripe, democracy and Wade Hampton
would not have gained the ascendency in 1876.”116 After his speech, the House
applauded him and voted to override the veto 80 to 4. DeLaughter later explained that he
would never forget the governor’s choice to veto this “small appropriation.”117
DeLaughter was re-elected in 1914, even though he missed many campaign
meetings due to his health. He suffered from stomach cancer, which caused him many
problems over a six- month period. He died on January 14, 1915. Unfortunately for him,
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this was a year before the unveiling of the monument he so proudly supported. Upon his
death, his friends and family from Edgefield remembered him as a man with “splendid
poise and excellent judgement.”118 The monument not only represents Meriwether, and
not only Tillman, but DeLaughter’s life and legacy.
The Own Brothers Marble Company from Greenwood, South Carolina
constructed the monument. The company was chosen over many competitors for this
project. According to available records, the company built two other monuments in South
Carolina. The first was a monument raised in Florence County dedicated to Silas Mercer
Keith. Keith was the captain of the Timmonsville Minute Men in Company E of the 8th
South Carolina Volunteer Regiment. On February 4, 1862, Keith was killed in a railroad
accident. The local branch of the United Daughters of the Confederacy argued that his
life should be honored, and raised $1,600 for the creation of this monument. It was
dedicated on June 5, 1914, two years before the unveiling of the Meriwether
monument.119 The other monument built by the Own Brothers company was dedicated to
the The Gist Rifles Markers. The company of the South Carolina 7th regiment that was a
part of Martin Witherspoon Gary’s brigade. The monument is located in Williamston,
South Carolina. The idea was also the UDC’s and the group raised $200 for it.
Although some differences are obvious—the state funded a commemoration of
the war of Reconstruction in the Meriwether monument—the monuments designed by the

118

“Find a Grave”, Accessed January 24, 2016, http://www.findagrave.com/cgibin/fg.cgi?page=pv&GRid=39581632&PIpi=108836468.
119
Robert S. Seigler, A Guide to Confederate Monuments in South Carolina (Columbia, S. C.: South Carolina
Department of Archives and History, 1997).

62

company represented the one-sided history evident in all South Carolina communities.
The two Confederate monuments honored soldiers but left no remembrance on the
monuments to the racial issues of the war. Such monuments uplifted the white memory of
the Civil War, and as Fitzhugh Brundage argues, shaped Southern memory in public
spaces by only representing the white side of history. Blacks were deliberately left out of
this cultural identity and out of access to public space as a means of shaping it. No
monuments were created to represent their history. Blacks were only able to celebrate
their memory through parades or holidays since whites controlled the public space in the
South.120 White celebrations created monuments as lasting symbols of white supremacy,
and many are still evident throughout the South today.
Yet if Reconstruction was a continuation of the Civil War, Meriwether was a
soldier, as well. And unlike the more generic monuments to Confederate memory
elsewhere, the Meriwether monument is “speaking symbol:” its celebration of white
supremacy is literally in and on the monument itself. The Meriwether monument is made
from Winnsboro granite, is 21 feet tall, and weighs around 27,000 pounds 121 This
granite is unique to South Carolina, especially in the Midlands and Piedmont region
where it is found. The granite is often called “South Carolina State Stone” or “Blue
Granite” because the stone produces a light blue or grey color.122 Tellingly, it is same
stone used in the construction of the South Carolina Statehouse. The original Statehouse
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was burned by William T. Sherman and the Union army in February of 1865. The new
building was completed in 1903. Both the monument and the institute of the state were
built with the same stone and are based on a society for white Carolinians.
There are four different panels on the monument. The first reads: “In memory of
Thomas McKie Meriwether, who on 8th of July, 1876, gave his life that the civilization
builded by his fathers might be preserved for the children unimpaired.”123 This panel
reveals what Steven Hahn has called a “civilizationist ideology”: it celebrates the white
fathers before Meriwether and a civilization founded on slavery and white supremacy.124
It also has a religious undertone of Christian martyrdom. As David Goldfield argues,
religion was incorporated in the way that white southerners remembered the past. “White
southerners,” he writes, “consciously compared their history to the crucifixion and
ascension of Jesus Christ: the Civil War and Reconstruction mirrored the death and
resurrection of the Savior.”125 The panel’s phrase “gave his life” echoes the sacrificial
offering of Christ. It does not state that Meriwether was murdered or assaulted, the
characterization used immediately after the massacre by those who justified their attack at
Hamburg. The panel also emphasizes the idea that Meriwether was young man, which
created a sense of innocence that made his death even more sacrificial and filial.
The second panel extends those motifs. It reads: “In youth’s glad morning the
unfinished years of manhood stretching before him with clear knowledge and courageous
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willingness he accepted death, and found forever the grateful remembrance of all who
know high and general service in maintaining of these civic and social institutions which
the men and women of his race had struggles through the centuries to establish in South
Carolina. What more can a man do than to lay down his life?”126 The second panel,
while it reiterates and complements the ideas from the first panel, is even more evocative
in its use of Christian allusion. To state that Meriwether accepted death with “clear
knowledge and courageous willingness” is similar to the death of Jesus. It is telling,
though, that nothing is evident of atonement, which, in some Christian and especially
evangelical theology, is the reason Christ accepted death. If Meriwether was sacrificed, it
was not because white men had sinned.
The third and last panel reads: “In his life he exemplified the highest ideal of
Anglo-Saxon civilization. By his death he assured to the children of his beloved land the
supremacy of that ideal. As his flame of life was quenched it lit the blaze of victory.”127
On this last panel, Meriwether is not characterized as a young man, but is transformed
into a father of white supremacy and white southerners. Similarly, the religious motif
switches from son to father. Throughout the Bible God refers to his followers as children.
The allusion gives the impression that God’s people are white Southerners inhabiting a
gifted land to build up Anglo-Saxon civilization. Interestingly, there is a connection here
to the chosen people saving the world, as well. As Charles Reagan Wilson argues, even in
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the Lost Cause white Southerners still claimed to be the “quintessential Americans.”128
At no time did “quintessential America” seem more threatened. “As the rest of the nation
had changed because of industrialism, urbanization, immigration, and other forces of
modern America,” Wilson writes, “the South had remained most like the nation of the
Founding Fathers.”129 The third panel also must be understood in relation to World War
I, and to the previous “reunion” of white Southerners to the nation and its martial defense
during the Spanish-American war.130 Both of these conflicts were racialized wars. The
Spanish had been portrayed as barbaric, mercenary hordes in 1898; the Germans in
World War I were rapidly coming to be seen as “Huns.” Both were threats to AngloSaxon civilization, and the monument served as a reminder of previous Anglo-Saxon
heroism in defense of civilization. Through the monument, honorable white Southerners
(who oddly in the antebellum period had been mythologized as Normans) were willing to
give their lives again. As Wilson writes, for white southerners, a new war offered the
chance to link the Lost Cause to America and to Anglo-Saxon civilization itself. White
southerners believed fighting in World War I vindicated the Confederacy since America
was fighting for the same beliefs as Confederates in the Civil War. The war would create
a new civil religion joining the North and South.131 The monument symbolized not just
a white Southern hero of Reconstruction, but an American martyr who laid down his life
for civilization and the Anglo-Saxon race.
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The unveiling of the monument took place on February 16, 1916. It was a ritual
ceremony. Goldfield argues that rituals connected southern history and faith—the
unveiling of monuments in public places served as a space for white southerners to come
together outside of church to honor southern history. The unveiling was structured like a
church service. Different speakers sanctified the life of Meriwether. “In the town of
North Augusta, in the center of Calhoun square,” the Edgefield Advertiser reported,
“stands a massive granite shaft that will be a silent tribute for many generations to come
to the brave and patriotic young man, McKie Meriwether, whose life was immolated on
his country’s altar in July 1876.”132 There was, in addition to the actual unveiling, a large
reception in the auditorium of the North Augusta high school, right across the street from
the monument. The chairman of the proceedings was John C. Sheppard, who had been
governor of South Carolina in 1886 and was a Tillmanite. Sheppard’s speech purportedly
described the conditions of the state in 1876. Along with a State House full of blacks and
carpetbaggers, “[t]he governor’s home was at that period the center of vulgarity and
vice,” Sheppard claimed, “and the people of South Carolina were required to bear it at the
point of the sword drawn by national government.”133 He declared that the people of
South Carolina were willing to fight in order to fix this government and argued that the
white Carolinians took up arms at Hamburg to defend themselves and their state. The
speaker stumbled into the word massacre but actually conjured up the old construction
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and connotation of riot without using the word. Sheppard make it clear that “it was not a
massacre in the brutal sense of that word… it was a rebellion against wrong, an armed
rebuke to tyranny and oppression.”134 Hamburg allowed Hampton to be elected governor,
he argued, which brought back rightful government.
After Sheppard’s opening speech, the guest of honor, D. S. Henderson, who was a
participant at Hamburg, discussed the event. Henderson first honored the life of
Meriwether and his patriotism in laying down his life for his country. While Sheppard
talked of Hamburg as redeeming the state, Henderson discussed the meaning of the
monument as one of redeeming national pride. And while Sheppard emphasized
Hamburg’s role in restoring pure government, Henderson emphasized its role in restoring
white civilization. With the start of World War I in Europe, many nations were looking to
the United States as an example both of democracy and of Western civilization.
Henderson claimed that the South was fully reconciled with the North, which created one
united nation to stand against others. These two regions, which were once separated,
were together fighting for the same ideas. “The New Nation with the new South as a
component part of it, stands today in the front of the nations of the world,” Henderson
said, “for the preservation of the world’s civilization and enlightenment.”135 With a
united country, a white man’s country, the United States could use their influence to
promote the ideas of the Anglo-Saxon world. He continued: “The troublous days of the
past of which we have been speaking are only in evidence now-a-days, that we may be
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able to remedy our past mistakes, and that we can with more power and success enforce
the principles we acted upon in our days of stress and turmoil.”136 The men who created
this monument believed that it was a symbol of the ideas for which the nation, not just the
state, should continue to remember and fight for. And the main idea was white
supremacy as the foundation of civilization. These ideas weren’t backward-looking
elegies, but helped to frame racial problems that would confront the state, the region, and
the nation for generations.
The monument is dedicated to Meriwether’s memory, but it is also a symbol of
Hamburg, which itself symbolizes the rise and decline of blacks within South Carolina.
In fact, the monument is the last visible vestige of the town. It was founded in Edgefield
District in 1821 by Henry Shultz, an entrepreneur who emigrated from Hamburg,
Germany. He was famous for creating a brigde that linked Augusta, Georgia to South
Carolina across the Savannah River. “Before 1 July 1821,” as Orville Vernon Burton has
written, “not a house stood in Hamburg, but by 1826, two hundred houses and fifty to
sixty stores served the twelve hundred inhabitants.”137 By 1822, Hamburg was producing
and shipping 35,000 bales of cotton, and the city’s population was around 2,000.138
Profit from the trade down the Savannah River grew so rapidly that Charleston merchants
funded a construction of a railroad from Charleston to Hamburg.139 Eventually, Hamburg
fell into a decline and disrepair because of railroad expansion and the Augusta Canal.
136

“McKie Meriwether: Monument Erected in North Augusta to Memory of Hero Who Lost Life in
Hamburg Riot,” Edgefield Advertiser, February 23, 1916.
137
Burton, In My Father’s House, 30.
138
J. Durelle Boles, collector. GEU, Benjamin Brantly printer. EMU10001453472, and J. Durelle Boles
Collection of Southern Imprints. GEU. Origin of the Town of Hamburg, South Carolina, .6
139
Burton, In My Father’s House, 30.

69

Shultz himself was even convicted of attempted murder, though only served half of his
sentence. But after seeing his town beaten in the race for commercial success by Augusta,
Shultz tried to commit suicide; though he failed at that, he died in poverty within the city
he created in 1851.140
One would have assumed that the city would have disappeared after the death of
Shultz, but it was brought back to life again during Reconstruction as a village notable for
its black political and economic entrepreneurship. Prince Rivers, Samuel L. Lee, and
Charles D. Hayne were freedmen who helped created Aiken County out of Edgefield, and
Hamburg was one of its new towns, along with Aiken and Beech Island.141 Many blacks
migrated to Hamburg because they found it a safe area away from the violence and
intimidation of whites. They also saw it as a place of opportunity. Rivers, for instance,
was one of the first freed slaves to join a black regiment in the Union army in South
Carolina. Lee was the first freedman to be admitted to the South Carolina bar, and also
served as speaker of the House in the legislature. Hayne was a skilled slave owned by a
wealthy Charleston family who migrated to the upcountry during Reconstruction to
pursue new political opportunities.142
Hamburg was Reconstruction in microcosm: it offered a promising future for
blacks, until the massacre and its violent illustration of what level of violence whites
were willing to commit in order to take back the state. Hamburg’s population slowly
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declined after the massacre. It became a ghost town, but it was not until a flood destroyed
most of the city in 1911 that its ultimate disappearance was sealed. By 1929 the last
residents left Hamburg; today the city no longer exists. The one remaining symbol of
Hamburg is the Meriwether monument.
Vernon Burton has argued that Reconstruction had a great influence on the South, even
more so than the Civil War or the American Revolution.143 He argues that Reconstruction
was not a failure, as white memory would make it; rather, as at Hamburg itself, it was
defeated by the white southerners.144 And the abandonment of the town is a fitting
symbol for Hamburg’s enduring legacy. Just as the town was erased, so too after
Reconstruction was the black memory of Hamburg, and even of Reconstruction itself.
As white Carolinians gained control of the state, they were able also to take full control
of Hamburg’s memory
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CONCLUSTION
WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM HISTORY
“Men die, and towns die, and cruelest of all, memories die,” Stephen Budiansky
argues, “And when North Augusta celebrated its centennial in 2006, Hamburg was
nowhere to be heard of, though the McKie Meriwether monument was duly catalogued in
an inventory of local historical sites the town compiled for the occasion.”145 For the 2006
centennial the monument was described as representing the only white man killed during
the Hamburg “riot”.146 The monument misrepresents the horrific history of white
Carolinian terrorism and manipulation of southern memory. The alteration in memory is
also evident in schools in North Augusta, as John Monk, writer for the Augusta
Chronicle, points out the eighth grade textbook that describes the event. The textbook
argues, “a company of black militia harassed two young white males from Edgefield.
Once news of the incident spread, a group of Edgefield whites stormed the local armory,
determined to take guns away from the militia. Several people died, and many others
were killed.”147 The murder of the six black men was not described, nor did the textbook
describe the planned racial violence white Carolinians used in order to regain political
power to create a racially divided South that would last for generations.
In 2011, the Heritage Council of North Augusta, a local non-profit organization,
sponsored the creation of a new Hamburg marker. The marker describes the deaths of the
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six black men at Hamburg. “After a dispute between whites and a black militia company,
about 200 men from local rifle clubs tried to disarm 38 black militiamen and others
barricaded in a warehouse,” the marker describes, “One white was killed and men on
each side were wounded before the blacks fled. Two blacks were killed trying to escape.
Whites captured 25-30 blacks and executed four of them. 87 whites were charged in the
massacre but were never tried for it.”148 Though names were not mentioned on the
marker, it was the first step in representing the true history of the massacre.
As the nation continues to debate the renaming of roads or buildings, and as it
deals with the controversy of the Confederate flag, it is essential for the nation to
recognize both sides of history. It is impossible to understand society today without
acknowledging the good and bad aspects of history. The Meriwether monument
represents a terrible part in Carolina history, but it is a disservice to the black men who
were murdered to overlook this moment because it is difficult to discuss. Before
southerners can move past the racial discrepancies of the past, the South must come to
terms with every aspect of its history. The Meriwether monument stands today as a
representation of the manipulation of southern history.
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